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ARGUMENT 
I. The Dygerts' Statement of Facts Is Fully Supported bv the Record on Appeal, 
In the introduction to their Statement of Facts and in paragraph 5 of their Disputed 
Facts Alleged by Appellant, Appellees object to the Dygerts' Statement of the Facts. 
Appellees assert that the Dygerts' "alleged facts are inconsistent with the record, are 
unfounded, are misleading and based upon what the Appellants 'allege5 or 'are prepared 
to prove.' (Appellees' Brief, pp. 5, 11, 12). 
Each of the facts set forth by the Dygerts is supported by citations to the Record on 
Appeal ("RA"), which includes pleadings, portions of depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. These facts should be considered by the Court 
because "summary judgment is appropriate only 'if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"7 {emphasis added). 
Moreover, this Court must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," which is the Dygerts.2 
1




II. Appellee Collier Was Closely Involved with the Billboard Sign Lease Dispute, 
In paragraph 1 of their Disputed Facts Alleged by Appellant, Appellees assert that 
they neither "individually disputed or had the right to dispute the sign company lease." 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 8). In fact, Appellee Collier was closely involved with the billboard 
sign lease dispute from its inception through the ensuing litigation and settlement of the 
lawsuit. Appellee Collier stated in his deposition: 
Q. After you received the letter, or Clearwater received the letter from Reagan 
Signs asserting their right of first refusal, did you or somebody on behalf of 
Clearwater contact Bonneville? 
A. Oh, I'm sure I probably called Kaye Cazier, but I don't recall the specific 
conversation. 
Q. Did you make a claim on your title insurance policy or did Clearwater make 
a claim on its title insurance policy? 
A. I don't know if Clearwater ever made a formal claim or if the title insurance 
carrier actually came and said, "You know, we'll help work through this." I 
don't recall. 
Q. Who provided the lawyer for the litigation? 
A. First American Title. 
A. I would talk to [the lawyer] on a pretty regular basis. I think I only 
met him personally on one occasion and that was to sign documents 
that acknowledged the lease and settle (sic) the lawsuit, {emphasis 
added) 
(RA 414,415). 
III. Appellee Youngberg's False Representations Prevented the Dvgerts from 
Having Sufficient Information to Trigger Inquiry Notice. 
In paragraph 2 of their Disputed Facts Alleged by Appellants, Appellees assert that 
the Dygerts "were clearly on notice of the potential that the sign lease could affect the 
2 
property they were contemplating purchasing and, therefore, they had a duty to inquire." 
(Appellees5 Brief, p. 9). The basis of their argument is that Appellee Youngberg had 
provided the Dygerts with a plat map showing a billboard sign lease encumbering a 
portion of Lot 5. Id. (A copy of the plat map is included in the Dygerts' Brief on page A-7 
and in Addendum B to Appellees' Brief.) According to Appellees, this plat map put the 
Dygerts on inquiry notice as to the billboard sign lease. Id. 
Appellees' argument is ridiculous. But it also goes to the heart of this case. 
The large billboard sign on the eastern portion of Lot 5 in Clearwater Estates was 
clearly visible in 1999 to the Dygerts before they purchased Lot 2. However, the cross-
hatched portion of the plat map provided by Appellee Youngberg unmistakably showed 
the Dygerts that the billboard sign easement only encumbered that part of Lot 5 where the 
sign is actually located. In fact, the billboard sign lease at that time encumbered a full 
five acres, including all of Lot 2. (RA 319, 320). Appellees were well aware of the broad 
scope of the encumbrance when Appellee Youngberg provided the Dygerts with the 
misleading plat map. (RA 319, 320, 408, 411, 628). 
Then, shortly after providing the misleading plat map, Appellee Youngberg also 
provided the Dygerts with a "Sellers Property Condition Disclosure (Land)" form. In this 
disclosure document, Appellee Youngberg falsely represented that: 
1. There was no ongoing litigation affecting Lot 2; 
2. There were no undisclosed easements affecting Lot 2; and 
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3. There was nothing that should be disclosed that materially or adversely 
affected the value of Lot 2. 
(RA 391, 392, 605-606; Appellees' Brief, Addendum C). Each of these false 
representations is a material misrepresentation.3 
Yet Appellees now have the temerity to argue that the burden of avoiding the 
calamity that befell the Dygerts was on the innocent buyers, not the duplicitous seller and 
its representatives. In effect, Appellees are asserting that the presence of a large billboard 
sign on a single lot in a subdivision, as a matter of law, puts a prospective buyer on 
"inquiry notice" to determine whether or not other lots in that subdivision are encumbered 
by a billboard sign lease. Appellees would have this Court impose such a duty on the 
innocent buyer even when the seller has made multiple material misrepresentations about 
the status of encumbrances to the affected residential property. This is not the law in 
Utah and has never been the law.4 
3
 Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, defines the term "material" as: 
"Important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits; having 
to do with matter, as distinguished from form." 
4
 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (UT 
1983)("Generally a failure to examine public records does not defeat an action for a false 
representation because in most cases there is no duty to make such an examination. 37 
Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 263 (1968). Thus, it has been held in fraud cases that a 
plaintiff who contracts to buy property is under no duty to examine public records to 
ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller.); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 
1246 (UT 1980)("[A] vendee of real property, in the absence of facts putting him on 
notice, has no duty to investigate to determine whether the vendor has misrepresented the 
area conveyed."); Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 21 P.3d 219, 225 (UT App. 2000): 
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IV. Appellee Youngberg's Misrepresentations Are Not Protected by Disclaimers. 
In paragraph 3 of their Disputed Facts Alleged by Appellants, Appellees assert that 
Appellee Youngberg's affirmative misrepresentations in the "Sellers Property Condition 
Disclosure (Land)'5 form about the status of title to Lot 2 in May 1999 are protected by 
disclaimers in that disclosure document. (Appellee's Brief, p. 9). Appellees have 
absolutely no legal support for this position. 
As a matter of public policy, tort disclaimers in contracts will not be enforced by the 
courts unless the disclaimer is very specific as to the tort it wishes to disclaim.5 There is no 
such specificity to the disclaimers in the "Sellers Property Condition Disclosure (Land)" 
form in which Appellee Youngberg made his egregious misrepresentations to the Dygerts. 
Nor is there such specificity in the "Real Estate Purchase Contract" between the Dygerts 
and Appellees' LLC. (RA 301-310; Appellees' Brief, Addendum A). 
More to the point, this is not a case of simple negligence subject to contract waivers 
of tort liability. 
In general, 'a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions 
of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under 
the circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his 
knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something which 
should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is 
required to make his own investigation.' (emphasis added) 
5
 Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,1356 (UT 1996), quoting from 
D.CR., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433,438 (UT 1983), ("While parties to a 
contract may generally exempt themselves from negligence liability, the language they 
use must 'clearly and unequivocally express an intent to limit tort liability' in the contract 
itself."). 
5 
This is a fraud case. In their Amended Complaint, the Dygerts have sued Appellees 
for: 1) fraud and misrepresentation; 2) conspiracy to defraud; 3) negligent 
misrepresentation; and 4) fraudulent nondisclosure. (RA 344-362). These are all tort 
claims. Each one is a specie of fraud, including negligent misrepresentation.6 Stated 
differently, none of the Dygerts' claims against Appellees involves an allegation of simple 
negligence. Therefore, no disclaimer could give Appellees the right to defraud the Dygerts 
in the transaction in question. 
Inexplicably, and without basis in the record on appeal, Appellees further assert that 
Appellee Youngberg's material misrepresentations to the Dygerts are protected because "in 
Clearwater Oaks opinion, there was nothing that materially or adversely affected the value 
of Lot 2." (Appellees' Brief, p. 10). This assertion is plain wrong. 
6
 Atkinson v. IHCHosps., Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (UT 1990),quoting Sugarhouse 
Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (UT 1980): 
We have heretofore defined fraud as "a false representation of 
an existing material fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the 
purpose of inducing reliance thereon upon which the plaintiff 
reasonably relies to his detriment." Negligent misrepresentation is 
a form of fraud which occurs when [o]ne who, in the course of his 
business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in 
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to 
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by the justifiable reliance 
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the information. 
{citations omitted){emphasis added) 
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First, Appellees' assertion is insupportable given that prospective buyers of Lot 1 in 
Clearwater Estates had walked out of their closing in 1998 upon learning that the billboard 
sign lease encumbered that lot. (RA 323, 324, 348,411, 628). Second, the Dygerts' buyers 
walked out of their closing in 2001 after learning about the billboard sign lease 
encumbrance. (RA 321, 346, 347, 394, 395, 609). Third, upon learning of the 
encumbrance, the lender for the Dygerts' buyers refused to lend on the property. (RA 611). 
Fourth, Appellees' opinion about the status of title to Lot 2 in 1999 is a disputed fact. It is 
a matter for a jury's consideration, not for this Court's consideration in reviewing the order 
below granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment.7 
V. Using False Statements and Active Concealment Appellees Deprived the 
Dygerts of Reliable Information, 
In part IV of their brief, Appellees assert that the Dygerts cannot show reliance upon 
Appellees' false representations about the status of title to Lot 2. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 19-
22). Appellees argument, however, is wrong on several crucial points. 
First, this argument entirely ignores the purposes of the "Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosure (Land)" form signed by Appellee Youngberg. One purpose is full and fair 
disclosure by the people in the best position to know: the sellers. Another purpose is to 
provide the buyers with information upon which they can rely. This disclosure document 
begins by stating: 
7
 WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 (UT 2002). 
7 
NOTICE TO SELLER. Each Seller is obligated under law to 
disclose to the Buyer all facts known to Seller that materially or 
adversely affect the value of the Property and that are not readily 
observable. This disclosure statement is designed to assist the 
Seller in complying with these disclosure requirements and to assist 
the Buyer in evaluating the property. The Company, and other 
real estate brokerages and agents will also rely upon the information 
contained in this disclosure statement, {emphasis added) 
(RA 605; Appellees' Brief, Addendum C). 
Second, Appellees knew that the title reports issued by Bonneville Title Company 
("Bonneville") would not show the existence of the billboard sign lease encumbrance. 
(RA 319, 320, 348). Appellees knew this because they had conspired with Bonneville to 
"insure over" the lease encumbrance, thus ensuring that such encumbrance would not 
appear in title reports issued to the Dygerts. Id. 
Third, Appellees reliance upon U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945 
(UT 1999) is completely misplaced. The billboard sign at issue in U.P.C. was actually 
located on the property purchased by plaintiff - not several hundred feet away on 
someone else's property. Of course, a purchaser of real property where a billboard sign is 
prominently located would have inquiry notice of the possibility of a sign lease. And this 
is what the Supreme Court held. 
Using false statements and active concealment, Appellees deprived the Dygerts of 
accurate information about the billboard sign lease encumbering Lot 2. Appellees should 
not now be heard to complain that the Dygerts could not justifiably rely on inaccurate 
information provided by Appellees and their coconspirators. 
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VI. Agency Law Issues Were Raised in the Court Below. 
In part VI of their brief, Appellees assert that, in the court below, the Dygerts 
never raised the issue of agency law as it applies to principals of business entities. 
(Appellees' Brief, pp. 37, 38) This is not true. 
In their memorandum in opposition dated May 31, 2002 and filed with the trial 
court, the Dygerts quoted the same passage from the opinion in Murphey Tugboat Co., 
Ltd. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd, 467 RSupp. 841, 850 (N.D. Cal. 
1979), affd 658 F.2d 1256,1257 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 
1713 (1982) that is quoted in the Dygerts' Brief of Appellants. That passage, quoted 
below exactly as it appears in the Dygerts' memorandum in opposition, is: 
Basic principles of tort and agency law provide the starting point for 
defining those circumstances. An agent "who does an act otherwise 
a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the 
command of the principal or on account of the principal." Applied to 
corporations, this rule of agency law means that "(a)n officer or 
director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he 
authorizes or directs or in which he participates, 
notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and 
not on his own behalf." Courts have, however, consistently stated 
that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, merely 
by virtue of his office, for the torts of his corporation. Personal 
liability must be founded upon specific acts by the individual 
director or officer, {citations omitted)(emphasis added) 
(RA 595). 
9 
VII. It Is Not Necessary to "Pierce the Veil" to Hold Appellees Personally Liable, 
In part VII of their brief, Appellees assert that they can only be held personally 
liable for their tortious acts committed on behalf of their LLC if "the veil is pierced." 
(Appellees5 Brief, pp. 38-40). This is not correct. 
As stated in 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1877: 
Observation: The liability of a director or corporate officer 
as a participant in a tort is distinct from the liability resulting 
from the "piercing of the corporate veil." The effect of piercing a 
corporate veil is to hold the owner liable, the rationale for doing so 
being that the corporation is something less than a bona fide 
independent entity. On the other hand, a director or officer who 
is liable as a participant in a tort is liable as an actor rather than 
as an owner. His liability is in no way dependent on a finding that 
the corporation is inadequately capitalized, that the corporation is a 
mere alter ego of himself, that the corporate form is being used to 
perpetrate a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been 
properly complied with - the absence of such findings does not 
affect the director's or officer's liability, {emphasis added) 
(RA 643; Appellees' Brief, A-8). See also Personally Liability of Corporate Officers, 
"For the Defense," June 2002 (RA 650-655; Brief of Appellants, A-13 to 1-18). 
VIII. Mr. Dygert's Status as a Young Attorney Has No Bearing on This Case. 
In part VIII of their brief, Appellees state that "[i]t is also pertinent to observe that 
the Appellant, Mr. Dygert, is an attorney." (Appellees' Brief, p. 42). It is true that Mr. 
Dygert graduated from law school in 1999 and became a member of the Utah State Bar 
later that year. This is the same year he and Mrs. Dygert purchased the residential 
property in question. However, it is puzzling why such information is pertinent to the 
10 
case at hand. Certainly Appellees have provided no authority suggesting that a young 
lawyer has a higher duty of care under the circumstances of this case than any other 
member of the public purchasing a parcel of residential real property. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees do not dispute that they committed the tortious acts alleged by the 
Dygerts. Indeed, they effectively concede the point by including in "Addendum C" to 
their brief the disclosure document containing Appellee Youngberg's false statements to 
the Dygerts about the billboard sign lease easement and dispute. 
Appellees core defense is that they are immune from liability for their own tortious 
conduct because they did everything on behalf of their own LLC, not for themselves 
personally. Appellees are asking this Court to give them immunity from civil prosecution 
for their wrongful acts simply because they had the business acumen to conduct their 
business affairs through an LLC, rather than by themselves personally. The law, 
however, does not shield Appellees from their own wrongful conduct. 
Nor does the law require more of the Dygerts than what they did in this case. 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision should be reversed in total and this case 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
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DATED this 22^ day of August, 2003. 
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